Chapter 117: Counterproductive
The complex international situation did not affect Austria's Near East development plan. After all, one must be strong to seize the opportunities that knock on the door.
The Near East development plan had been launched in 1884, and four years had already passed.
Four years is but a minor episode for a country; however, for a region, it can bring about revolutionary changes.
Compared to the desolation that had prevailed just after the war four years earlier, the Near East had now transformed into a massive construction site.
Railroads progressed like winding dragons; towns sprang up from the ground; while old cities were still being demolished, new cities were already being built.
In just four short years, Austria had migrated over three million people to the Near East, gaining control over most of the region.
"The progress of the Near East development plan is still too slow. With the current pace, it might not be completed even in another ten years.
The international situation is increasingly tense, and the possibility of war breaking out in Europe is growing. We do not have enough time to wait. The government must find ways to accelerate development in the Near East," Franz said.
To outsiders, the Near East was advancing at an astonishing rate, but to Franz, it still seemed too slow.
Four years had passed, and the Near East was still a massive construction site. Aside from establishing a batch of small towns, bigger projects were still underway.
The original plan was to complete the redevelopment of the Near East within ten years, but reality showed Franz that it was simply unachievable.
Prime Minister Carl exclaimed in shock, "Your Majesty, our progress in the Near East is already very fast. Hastening blindly will lead to a series of problems."
It's not that progress can't be accelerated, but achieving faster results without compromising construction quality is already quite difficult.
After all, engineering machinery was scarce those days, and everything depended on manual labor. The constraint on quickly completing the Near East development plan was not a lack of effort by the Austrian government, but rather that the productive forces could not keep up.
Franz was not an engineering mechanic. He could not be of help on this issue. Even if he could draw the schematics of future equipment, those would only show the external design, not knowing anything about the internals.
Creating engineering equipment based merely on external designs was simply unrealistic. Much foundational scientific knowledge was involved in the internals of many mechanical devices, and they could not be manufactured without this knowledge.
Franz shook his head, "International situations change rapidly, and time waits for no one. If the Near East development plan cannot be completed quickly, then we should prioritize projects, ensuring that critical projects like roads, bridges, and stations are prioritized; delaying new urban construction projects is acceptable."
Franz admitted that he was impatient, but his intuition told him that the day when Europe's situation would spiral out of control was not far off.
Without expanding the railroad network before war broke out and laying the foundation for connectivity with Africa, he felt uneasy.
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Prime Minister Carl reminded him, "Your Majesty, after we issued our warning, the French have already made concessions, and negotiations with France, Belgium, and Germany are now underway.
Considering the current situation in Europe, the French are still not prepared for war, and the likelihood of a European war breaking out is still very small.
The Near East development plan is a cohesive whole, with each project complementing the others.
Slowing down urban construction along the way and blindly speeding up railroad construction will result in severe operational deficits for a long time to come, which is economically very unsound."
A European war is unlikely to break out soon; this is not just the personal opinion of Prime Minister Carl. Most people within the Austrian government, and even 99% of Europeans, hold this view.
The friction between France, Belgium, and Germany was just a minor tiff, with the French's actions at most constituting political blackmail under military threat.
The greatest risk of war stemmed from the opposition between two major alliances. However, at present, tensions between these alliances were limited to deteriorating relations between Britain and Russia, while France and Austria were just engaging in typical power struggles.
Franz shook his head, "Let there be losses. We never expected to make money from the Near East's railways. Completing the project sooner just means greater losses.
For the sake of gaining strategic initiative, we can afford this price."
Economic calculations, however important, cannot outweigh national strategic security. The railway spanning the Near East meant that Austria had gained a strategic advantage over France.
Of course, this was based on the ongoing nature of a European war. If the outcome was decided at the start, this plan would also lose its importance.
Sometimes Franz wondered whether to follow Prussia's example and strike first, catching the French off guard.
But considering Britain and Russia, Franz decisively abandoned this tempting plan. The benefits of success were limited, while failure meant losing everything.
Not initiating a war did not mean Franz did nothing. The French dared to impose harsh terms on Prussia and Germany precisely because Austria had allowed it.
Although it seemed the French had gained an advantage, they had also pushed themselves into opposition with other European countries.
On the surface, everyone appeared passive and did nothing, but subconsciously, the "French threat theory" was emerging in many people's minds.
Do not expect everyone to be rational; driven by this "subconscious fear," if a war between France and Austria were to break out, people would naturally tend to side with Austria.
...
On November 24, 1888, after a series of negotiations, France, Belgium, and Germany signed the "Coal Export Agreement" in Paris.
Unsurprisingly, the French government emerged victorious, as the treaty stipulated that Belgium and Germany would export fifty million tons of coal to France at a fixed price over the next five years, including no less than eight million tons of high-quality coking coal.
The term "fixed price" summed up the distress of Belgium and Germany, and although the treaty did not explicitly explain, everyone knew it was an extremely low price.
Specifically, less than a month after the signing of the treaty, the domestic retail price of coal in France had fallen by nearly one-fifth.
With coal prices dropping, the biggest beneficiary was the steel industry. In the last month of 1888, French steel production had increased by 18% compared to the same period the previous year.
This was just a beginning. Affected by the drop in energy prices, French industry began to experience a second spring.
Capitalists who benefited did not forget to sing praises for the government. Overnight, Napoleon IV became the greatest monarch of France.
Everyone loves to hear good things. Watching the fanciful praise on the newspapers, Napoleon IV also enjoyed himself.
Soon Napoleon IV could no longer be pleased. Having tasted the sweet benefits, the capitalists were not satisfied, they wanted even more.
"Fixed price coal," no matter how cheap, is still not as beneficial as possessing it directly, and, moreover, it was not easy to purchase.
The French government's pressure was nothing more than forcing Belgium and Germany to reduce the taxes on coal exported to France. Coal mining companies still needed to make a profit.
Even if the government had signed the treaty, capitalists could simply ignore it. Many companies, after the signing, had even raised the factory price for the French.
Some nationalist capitalists outright refused to sell coal to the French as a protest against the unequal treaty.
The governments of Belgium and Germany, too, had their principles. They had already pushed their limits by reducing taxes; forcing enterprises to lower the export prices was simply impossible.
After the treaty was signed, the quantity of coal France imported from Belgium and Germany did not increase but decreased. "Fixed price coal" indeed existed, but was just out of reach.
From the decline in domestic coal prices in France, one can see that the price of imported coal was only on par with international market prices. Coal mining companies in Belgium and Germany were unwilling to sell below market price.
The government had indeed reduced taxes, but the companies were unwilling to lower their prices. Every capitalist wanted to earn more, didn't they?
The main contradiction now was not between countries, but between capitalists.
Using conventional methods, French capitalists naturally could not cope with the coal barons of Belgium and Germany and could only turn to the government for help.
...
At the Palace of Versailles, Napoleon IV frowned and asked, "What do you think about the proposal from the Steel Association?"
Foreign Minister Karl Chardlets said, "Your Majesty, we have just signed a treaty with Belgium and Germany. Violating it so soon would be indefensible in the international community.
From the current situation, it seems unlikely that the governments of Belgium and Germany will make further concessions. Forcing them into a trade could backfire."
In fact, from the beginning, Karl Chardlets had opposed overly pressuring Belgium and Germany, advocating for price pressure through unified procurement contracts.
However, domestic capitalists did not cooperate. Everyone was used to freedom; how could they hand over purchasing rights to the government?
As it turned out, coercion indeed did not solve the problem. Although the three governments reached an agreement, domestic companies from the other countries still resisted.
While the situation of exorbitantly priced coal no longer existed, purchasing cheap coal below the international average price remained impossible.
Many companies in Belgium and Germany refused to export coal to France, not because the capitalists were overly patriotic but because they were driven by domestic nationalism.
Nationalism had risen, and now doing business with the French meant bearing the label of a traitor.
It wasn't only coal mining companies—many companies in Belgium and Germany stopped cooperating with the French, and a society-wide boycott of French goods ensued.
This was why French capitalists were eager to seek government help.
If they didn't suppress the anti-French wave in the two countries, France, which already had limited international markets, would lose even more.
Economic Minister Elsa said, "Government interference might indeed bring uncertain risks, but the situation is already out of control.
If the government does not intervene, we won't only be unable to acquire cheap coal, but we will also lose our market in Belgium and Germany.
Various signs indicate that behind this, there is Britain and Austro-Hungarian capital stirring things up. The leading companies that have resisted exporting coal to us have stakes held by Britain and Austria."
...